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Access to basic reproductive rights: Global Challenges 
Sheelagh McGuinness and Heather Widdows 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognised that if women are to have true equality with men they must be 
able to control the number of children they have and the time of childbirth. There are many 
factors that impact on this ability but key are access to family planning services, particularly 
safe contraception and abortion. That is the focus of this chapter. The central premise of our 
analysis is that access to contraception and abortion are properly understood as basic 
reproductive rights. Our claim is that to disallow such access is effectively to bar women 
from attaining equality with men by denying minimal standards of bodily integrity. We argue 
for access to contraception and abortion as basic reproductive rights because they are 
necessary to for controlling fertility and childbirth and as such necessary to make women 
equal to men. Basic reproductive rights should not be ‘trumped’ by other rights or sacrificed 
or compromised to attain other goods.  
 
The chapter is divided into three distinct parts. In the first section we provide the 
philosophical foundation which grounds our claim that women must be able to access 
contraception and abortion if they are to be truly equal to men. We move from this to provide 
a very brief overview of the evolution of how reproductive rights are conceptualised in 
international human rights norms. The final part of the chapter is focused on current threats to 
access to abortion and contraception. We provide an overview of one of the biggest 
impediments to family planning services on a global scale – the Global Gag Rule (GGGR). 
We describe the emergence of this rule and its impact. Looking forward we consider the 
importance of continued improvements in women’s reproductive rights ‘post 2015’; and we 
argue that restrictions on development aid funding of particular aspects of family planning 
services, for instance, safe abortion care, constitute a retrograde step and should be resisted.  
 
Given the basic nature of rights to access contraception it is not enough to protect these rights 
in a ‘negative’ or ‘non-interference’ form; rather we must ensure an “enabling environment” 
such that both abortion and contraception are accessible to women (Cohen 2012). Our 
approach echoes that of reproductive justice scholars who “simultaneously demand a 
negative right of freedom from undue government interference and a positive right to 
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government action in creating conditions of social justice and human flourishing for all.” 
(Luna & Luker 2013, 328) Access to contraception and abortion are key to women and girls’ 
ability to achieve equality because in the words of Sen and Batiwala: 
 
The control of women’s and girls’ sexuality and reproduction is at the heart of 
unequal gender relations, and is central to the denial of equality and self-
determination to women. (as quoted in Baird 2004, 142) 
 
 
 
We argue that these rights are basic on the grounds that such rights are assumed and taken for 
granted by men; because there is no parallel threat to which men are subject, men cannot be 
invaded in a similar way. Accordingly, if women are to be equal to men, then such basic 
rights are required for women to attain the same minimal standard of bodily control that all 
men automatically have. Moreover, such rights are basic in that they are necessary for the 
exercise of all other (human) rights, as basic bodily integrity and control is a prerequisite for 
the exercising of other rights.  
 
 
 
 
II: CONCEPTUALISING BASIC REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
(a)What are reproductive rights? 
Following Catherine MacKinnon, we ground our arguments about the importance of 
reproductive control as a basic right (the ability to actually access contraception and abortion 
and correspondingly the ability to refuse to undergo such procedures) in arguments from sex 
equality (MacKinnon 1991).  
 
The nature of reproductive rights is highly contested, in terms of what they are and what they 
should be. In this chapter we separate ‘basic’ reproductive rights from other possible 
understandings of reproductive rights and we justify our position on a gendered basis using 
equality arguments. Reva Siegel summarises some of the key features of a sex equality 
approach to reproductive rights as follows: 
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[T]he sex equality approach to reproductive rights views control over the timing 
of motherhood as crucial to the status and welfare of women, individually and as a 
class. Arguments from the sex equality standpoint appreciate that there is both 
practical and dignitary significance to the decisional control that reproductive 
rights afford women, and that such control matters more to women who are status 
marked by reason of class, race, age, or marriage. Control over whether and when 
to give birth is practically important to women for reasons inflected with gender-
justice concern: It crucially affects women’s health and sexual freedom, their 
ability to enter and end relationships, their education and job training, their ability 
to provide for their families, and their ability to negotiate work-family conflicts in 
institutions organized on the basis of traditional sex-role assumptions that this 
society no longer believes fair to enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to 
redress. (Siegel 2007, 818-819) 
 
Other arguments could be used and philosophically and legally there is no consensus around 
what reproductive rights are. Moreover, the topic is highly contested, both in conceptual 
terms of what reproductive rights could and should amount to, and in practical terms about 
how such rights should be provided. The global picture is one of complexity and confusion. 
For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) does not explicitly 
mention reproductive rights, although they are implied in the right to found a family (article 
16), and the importance of bodily integrity which forbids torture and cruel or inhuman 
treatment and punishment (article 5). Taken together, these rights can be used to claim that no 
one should be physically prevented from conceiving and bearing children; or conversely that 
no one should be forced to carry a child. Given there is so little clarity about what 
reproductive rights are it is not surprising that what is available in practice varies widely both 
within localities and globally. In section two of this chapter we will track the evolution of 
human rights discourse on reproductive rights and note some of the key changes in how such 
rights are conceptualised. 
 
(b)The importance of ‘gender’ back in the reproductive rights debate 
Debates about reproductive rights touch on many controversial and sensitive issues. Perhaps 
one of the most contested issues relates to the moral status of the embryo/ foetus. It is this 
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way of framing the debate that is typical of ‘pro-choice’, ‘pro-life’ categories which beset 
much of the polarised political debate (Widdows 2013, 201-204). Such arguments ‘against 
abortion’ are often made on religious grounds or on claims regarding the necessary features 
for moral personhood (Steinbock 1992). Those who wish to restrict access to abortion assert 
the ‘personhood’ or ‘sanctity’ of the embryo at various stages, including conception, 
quickening, and viability and many who are not religious also share such views (George & 
Tollefsen 2008). Fetal centric arguments often assume a complete separation between the 
pregnant woman and the foetus, elevating the latter to the status of the individual of equal 
moral worth to the woman. Such arguments are evident in the growing legal trend to afford 
protection to the foetus through the constitutionalization of fetal rights (DeLondras 2015). 
These arguments construct maternal/ fetal conflict and acknowledge the embodied nature of 
pregnancy only to the extent that the pregnant woman is viewed as a threat to the foetus. The 
argument posits the woman as an aggressor and the foetus as an innocent bystander rather 
than a dependent. As Susan Bordo summarises: “as the personhood of the pregnant woman 
has been drained from her and her function as fetal incubator activated, the subjectivity of the 
fetus has been elevated” (Bordo 1993, 85). These arguments have been used to justify 
restrictions on both abortion and contraception, although ironically they have sometimes had 
the perverse consequence of increasing the number of abortions rather than decreasing them 
(Cohen 2012).   
 
Fetal centric arguments are also often constructed in ways that fail to take account of the 
gendered nature of reproduction. In this chapter our approach is fundamentally gendered and 
highlights the gender injustice involved in failure to grant access to contraception and 
abortion. In adopting a gendered lens our intention is to highlight that not only are women 
suffering from lack of access to contraception and abortion, but to show that this injustice is 
partly an injustice which women suffer as women. Failure to protect women from 
disadvantages and injustices they experience solely because of their gender undermines the 
universality of ‘rights’ (Cook 1993). Women’s reproductive rights are not just controversial 
in the abortion debate, but in other debates about family and social structures, and often these 
issues share commonality with the abortion debate in that they are essentially about 
controlling women’s bodies. In the words of Alison Jagger “because women are typically 
seen as the symbols or bearers of culture, conflicts among cultural groups are often fought on 
the terrain of women’s bodies”. (Jaggar 2005, 46) Attempts to control women’s bodies, 
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particularly their sexual and reproductive functions, have a long and global history. Ways in 
which such control has been manifested in the family include practices of female genital 
mutilation, chastity belts, chaperoning women, restricting freedom by denying movement or 
employment outside the home (to prevent opportunities for non-approved sexual encounters) 
(Chavkin & Chesler 2005). In addition, blame for sexual and reproductive ‘mistakes’ or what 
is deemed inappropriate behaviour usually, and across cultures, falls disproportionally upon 
women. Such disparities raise equality questions as such attempts to control reproduction do 
not apply to men, and rarely to boys. Patriarchal norms have shaped many aspects of the 
world we inhabit and are mirrored at the policy level in marriage and divorce laws, 
employment laws and perhaps most obviously in policies of population control. To neglect 
the gendered aspect of reproductive rights is to neglect key features of the injustices involved 
and to fail to accord these rights the respect they deserve. Hence in the next section we 
develop an argument for access to contraception and abortion that is gender sensitive and 
grounds these basic reproductive rights in an argument from equality. 
 
(c) Basic Reproductive Rights from Equality   
In this section we argue that in order for women to achieve equality with men, to be human, 
basic reproductive rights – including access to contraception and abortion – must be 
accessible to all women. From this argument follow claims about the importance of basic 
reproductive rights and the necessity of granting these over and before other rights – 
including, but not only, other reproductive rights. However, it is not necessary to agree with 
our argument to agree with our conclusion that these rights are basic for women to function 
effectively. For instance, one could argue from a perspective of autonomy that women should 
have access to these rights in order to be able to exercise their autonomy and make choices 
for their own lives, or that such rights follow from arguments based on negative rights of 
non-interference.1 Moreover, some of these arguments complement and supplement our 
claims. Given this it is possible to accept our conclusion that these basic rights are necessary, 
and to endorse the claims made in the latter part of the chapter about the global need to grant 
these basic rights to women, without endorsing the philosophical foundational argument 
regarding how to ground and construct such rights.   
                                                          
1 Other arguments could be made on autonomy grounds; our claims is not that such  
arguments cannot be made but we simply wish to focus on the equality argument for this 
chapter.  
6 
 
 
We argue that these rights are basic and are necessary for women to be human and equal to 
men. We argue that these rights are basic not because they are negative rights, nor because 
they are autonomy rights, but on grounds of equality. This then is a threshold concept. Only 
by guaranteeing bodily control, by the means of contraception and abortion, can women 
attain a comparable standard of bodily integrity to men and thus can the requirements of 
equality be met.2  
 
To make this argument we introduce the debate about whether ‘women’s rights’ amount to 
‘human rights’. We endorse the view that where there is a gap between the rights which 
women hold and the rights which men hold this should be closed if women are to be said to 
enjoy ‘human rights’. If this gap is not closed then women cannot be considered human, but 
are effectively subhuman, and treated as inferior to men. This approach draws on the seminal 
work by Catharine MacKinnon who asks ‘are women human?’ (MacKinnon 2006).3 Her 
work considers women’s rights taken as a whole, and not simply reproductive rights, and she 
is especially concerned with rape and violence in the context of conflict. But the structure, 
assumptions and implications of her argument can be applied equally to reproductive rights. 
She states:  
 
If women were human, would we be a cash crop shipped from Thailand in 
containers into New York's brothels? Would be we sexual and reproductive 
slaves? Would we be bred, worked without pay our whole lives, burned when our 
dowry money wasn't enough or when men tired of us, starved as widows when 
our husbands died (if we survived his funeral pyre), sold for sex because we are 
not valued for anything else? Would we be sold into marriage to priests to atone 
for our family’s sins or to improve our earthly prospects? Would we, when 
allowed to work for pay, be made to work at the most menial jobs and exploited at 
barely starvation level? Would we have our genitals sliced out to “cleanse” us (our 
body parts are dirt?) to control us, to mark us and define our cultures? Would we 
                                                          
2 Attempts to imagine what a similar bodily invasion would amount to for a man are the 
subject of many philosophical papers, the most famous being the Judith Jarvis Thomson’s 
violinist, which is still central to the philosophical debate. (Jarvis Thomson 1971) 
3 This was first published in 1999 in Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, but is reprinted in MacKinnon’s 2006 collection of the same title.  
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be trafficked as things for sexual use and entertainment worldwide in whatever 
form current technology makes possible? Would we be kept from learning to read 
and write? … Would we be sexually molested in our families? Would we be raped 
in genocide to terrorize and eject and destroy our ethnic communities, and raped 
again in that undeclared war that goes on every day in every country in the world 
in what is called peacetime? If women were human, would our violation be 
enjoyed by our violators? And, if we were human, when these things happened, 
would virtually nothing be done about it?” (MacKinnon 2006, p. 41) 
 
MacKinnon’s language is deliberately rhetorical and dramatic and intentionally controversial. 
Yet her point is simple: that many of the injustices to which women are subjected are 
gendered. The type of injustices that are often done to women happen only to women, they do 
not happen to men. That many of the injustices which MacKinnon lists are connected to sex 
and reproduction is not surprising given the asymmetrical way they are experienced by 
women and men. Sex and reproduction are sites in which women’s experience and men’s 
experience is divergent, and as MacKinnon states, “nowhere is sexuality not central to 
keeping women down” (MacKinnon 2006, 13). It is this divergence which MacKinnon 
focuses on to explain why such gendered injustices are so widely perpetrated and why 
comparatively little is done to address them, and certainly less than would be done to address 
them if they were non-gendered injustices. If we reframe MacKinnon’s argument slightly so 
that it directly maps the argument we are making about basic reproductive rights, and why 
access to contraception and abortion are required if women are to be equal to men, then it 
would run something like this: 
 
‘If women were human would they be denied the right to prevent the invasion of their bodies 
and involuntary impregnation? Would a foreign body be allowed to feed from them, to grow 
inside them, and to transform the shape of their body? Would they be required to adapt their 
lifestyles, eating, drinking and physical activities to accommodate another? Would their 
wombs be treated as separate from themselves and regarded as the property of others? 
Would others – husbands, family, religious and cultural leaders, NGOs and policy makers – 
be able to determine whether or not they put their lives at risk though the risks of 
childbearing? If women were human would they not be granted the same minimum 
expectation of bodily integrity as men? 
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This is just an example of how such an argument could run, and we are not committed to any 
particular clause. We are merely introducing it as a hypothetical exercise that is useful in 
highlighting the gendered nature of reproductive rights. Putting the argument this way is, like 
MacKinnon’s, rhetorical and confrontational and designed to be so. The style can be objected 
to on the grounds that such aggressive language obscures because of its highly political and 
polemical nature. However, such an approach is useful as a device to show the gender 
differential which is fundamental to claims about reproductive rights. When one formulates 
the claims to basic rights in this way, and makes women overtly the focus of the argument, 
and women as human beings qua human being, then the gender injustice emerges clearly. 
Formulated in this way, focusing on how women are treated when compared to men – or 
women as compared to ‘full humans’ – then the extent of what is denied to women when they 
are denied contraception and abortion is clear. Thinking of reproductive rights in this 
framework helps us identify why such rights are basic – because they are threshold rights 
which allow women to be equal to men. It also provides reasons for prioritising such rights 
over other rights, and for not simply regarding these as ‘negative rights’ (rights to be left 
alone, rather than positive rights to actually have access). Such rights are basic, because they 
are threshold rights, assuring women’s equality to men.  
 
MacKinnon’s approach highlights that often ‘human rights’ means ‘men’s rights’ as ‘men’ 
are the archetypal ‘human’: the human rights system is structured and constructed according 
to male priorities rather than female priorities. For instance, MacKinnon suggests that it is 
likely that women would prioritise rights differently than men. Thus she states, “lacking 
effective guarantees of economic and social rights, women have found political and civil 
rights, however crucial, to be largely inaccessible and superficial” (MacKinnon 2006, 5-6).4 
MacKinnon’s critique suggests that women’s rights initiatives have done little to address the 
gendered nature of human rights. For instance, she argues that the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) says little about the 
evils of sexism and the inferiority of women.5 However, one does not need to endorse all of 
                                                          
4 Furthermore she continues that “The generational distinctions and their rankings, 
questionable for men as well, are clearly premised on gendered assumptions, perceptions and 
priorities”. (MacKinnon 2006, 6). 
5 Of course this is one view and many feminists welcome CEDAW as a huge advance in 
women’s rights. 
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MacKinnon’s wider claims about the failures of human rights as women’s rights to think that 
there are gendered injustices which must be addressed if women are to be equal to men and to 
think that MacKinnon’s style of argumentation is useful for revealing these. With regard to 
basic reproductive rights, rights which raise women up to the same status and standard as 
men, her gendered analysis is revealing. Only if these basic reproductive rights are attained 
can women take for granted certain aspects of bodily integrity which men automatically have. 
Without the rights to avoid pregnancy or to end pregnancy (using the means of contraception 
and abortion services) women lack both bodily integrity and basic control of their 
reproductive functions. These are functions which men do not lack (men cannot suffer similar 
breaches in bodily integrity) and furthermore these rights are basic in that without them 
women are unable to exercise agency in other fields, including those of relationships and 
employment. Such control is a necessary aspect of not only furthering women’s emancipation 
and equality in general, but importantly as threshold rights that allow women to experience 
the basic bodily integrity and control which men experience. Accordingly if women are to be 
granted human rights, these basic reproductive rights must be granted not just as formal rights 
of access. It is not enough for such rights to be formally available – not prohibited – but they 
must be actually available. Given this, these services are not, we argue, supplementary or 
mere parts of healthcare packages that can be reasonably sacrificed in order for women to 
gain other goods.  
 
IV. Beyond Basic Rights 
In this chapter we are not denying that there are, or may be, other reproductive rights, for 
instance, rights to parent. However, we are claiming that there are no other basic reproductive 
rights, at least such rights cannot be constructed from or grounded in equality claims. Further 
while we argue that access to contraception and abortion is a basic right – and one which is 
currently conspicuously lacking for a large amount of women globally – the parallel rights 
not to be coerced into abortion and sterilization are also basic, as these too can be grounded in 
equality. The debate about basic reproductive rights does not exhaust the reproductive rights 
debate and there are many other issues that are pertinent to the reproductive rights debate. In 
particular there are questions about whether there is a right to access reproductive 
technologies. This right is particularly claimed from the ‘right to found a family’. However, 
rights to reproductive technology are not basic rights in the way we have argued the case, as 
they do not contravene the gender equality criteria and as such are not threshold rights and 
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thus are not our concern in this chapter. Before going on to consider specific case studies on 
access to contraception and abortion we will provide a brief overview of how human rights 
discourses on reproductive rights and how we conceptualise them have evolved. 
 
III: WHERE HUMAN RIGHTS BEGIN - THE SMALL PLACES 
In this part of the chapter we consider the emergence and development of reproductive rights 
within human rights discourse. In doing so we are mindful of the limitations of international 
human rights documents and wary of the criticisms of scholars like MacKinnon as discussed 
above. However, consideration of the development of human rights gives us some cause to be 
hopeful, particularly the way in which human rights have empowered grassroots advocates by 
providing a rhetorical frame which they can use to ground claims against the State (Cook & 
Dickens 2009). International human rights are also being used as a mechanism for improving 
access to abortion services in countries like Poland and Ireland where such services are 
highly restricted (Erdman 2014). As such it is increasingly becoming evident to both scholars 
and activists who are advocating for improved reproductive futures for women in a variety of 
contexts that the incorporation of human rights within reproductive justice frameworks can be 
an important tool of empowerment (Luna 2009). In the twenty years since the International 
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo we have witnessed some huge 
improvements to women’s health worldwide, so while there is still much to do it is clear that 
human rights discourses have been a useful political tool for activists worldwide. 
 
In considering the question of where human rights begin Eleanor Roosevelt posited “the 
small places.” Here Roosevelt is hinting to the fact that human rights are important in all 
aspects of our lives – for only through achieving justice and equality in these spaces is it 
possible to achieve justice and equality in bigger more public spaces. The full quote is as 
follows: 
 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home 
– so close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet 
they are the world of the individual person; the neighbourhood he lives in; the 
school or college he attends; the factory, farm or office where he works. Such are 
the places where every man, woman and child seeks equal justice, equal 
opportunity, equal dignity without discrimination. Unless these rights have 
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meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. Without concerned citizen 
action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for progress in the 
larger world.6 
 
Roosevelt was speaking in 1958, a decade after the creation of the UDHR. Roosevelt’s 
sentiment holds to this day and is particularly apt in considering the importance and necessity 
of controlling sexual and reproductive activity if women are to have equality with men, or in 
MacKinnon’s words be “truly human”. In this section we provide a brief overview of 
women’s human rights paying specific attention to changing discourses around sexual and 
reproductive health. We do not aim here to be comprehensive in our account but rather to 
highlight some key shifts in emphasis. 
 
The UDHR explicitly challenges the oppression of women in what was traditionally deemed 
the ‘private sphere’. In so doing, it steps into the small places and transcends the traditional 
dichotomy of public and private spaces – a dichotomy feminist scholars have long rejected 
(see for example Pateman 1983). The UDHR recognises that in order to fully advance 
women’s rights the State must advance not just ‘public’ rights, for example, employment but 
also ‘private’ rights, for example, consent to marriage and education. Reproductive rights 
have long been recognised at the international level as a sub-set of human rights. At the 
United Nations (UN) Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in 1968 Resolution XVIII on 
the Human Rights Aspects of Family Planning was adopted. This resolution states that 
“couples have a basic human right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and a right to adequate education and information in this respect”.7 
This was adopted by a resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1969 and provides the basis 
upon which current Declarations regarding sexual and reproductive health rights are based.  
 
CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979. This Convention is important in 
providing protection for a broad range of rights; those specifically important in the context of 
our analysis include rights in marriage, health, and family planning. The Convention 
                                                          
6 http://www.un.org/en/globalissues/briefingpapers/humanrights/quotes.shtml (accessed 
31/07/15) 
7 ‘Reproductive Rights’ http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/rights/  
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specifically aims to redress the systemic discrimination against women evident in society and 
with its adoption “UN emphasis turned to moving women to the center of development 
strategies” (Chesler 2006, 15). It is beyond the scope of the chapter to map the trajectory of 
women’s rights from this point forward (on this see for example Bunch 1990, Cook 1993) but 
it is clear that human rights instruments developed as an important tool in the global 
enfranchisement of women. Importantly in 1993, in Vienna, the World Conference on 
Human Rights reaffirmed that the protection of women’s rights was integral to the protection 
of human rights calling for an end to discrimination against women and women’s 
enfranchisement in all aspects of political and social life (World Conference on Human 
Rights, Vienna, 1993). Attention to the importance of protecting sexual and reproductive 
health rights as part of this has become the focus of increasingly levels of attention since the 
early 1990s with calls for “maternal and reproductive health policies” to be “understood as a 
basic obligation of the state’s positive social responsibility to protect women’s right to life, 
liberty, and security (Chesler 2006, 17).  
 
The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 was a 
UN led gathering which focused on the legitimacy and success of global population policies. 
The Cairo Programme of Action (ICPD 1994) produced a twenty year roadmap (1995 – 
2015) for how human rights could be used to protect women’s rights to bodily integrity and 
in particular their ability to control the timing and number of their children. Importantly this 
roadmap is concerned not just with the needs of adults but also those of adolescent children. 
The framing of these protections are not just individual but it is also emphasised that these 
protections are necessary for the good of society generally. A key feature of the Programme 
was to increase investment and expenditure on sexual and reproductive health in a broad 
range of areas including access to healthcare, education, and family planning. It aimed to 
reduce maternal child mortality rates and incidence of sexually transmitted disease globally. 
ICPD 1994 was the first time that safe abortion care was recognised as a necessary feature of 
reducing maternal morbidity and mortality globally. It draws on public health rhetoric and 
arguments from harm reduction to emphasis the importance in reducing the incidence of 
unsafe abortions (Hessini 2005). 
 
Dixon Mueller explains a fundamental tension that exists in the development of family 
planning policies and the subsequent emergence of sexual and reproductive rights (Dixon 
13 
 
Mueller, 1995). The first strand is that of population control. Family planning policies 
emerged in order to enable governments to deal with excessive population growth. The 
second strand to these policies is the protection of individual human rights. Family planning 
policies have developed to enable individual, and in particular women’s, expression of rights 
of bodily control and bodily integrity. However, it is often the case that population control 
policies have infringed on individual human rights.  
 
Population control policies include education, the provision of contraception and abortion and 
sterilization; at times such measures have been forced. A controversial aspect of population 
control policies, forced sterilization, has a long history in Europe and the US. In the early 20th 
century it was widely practiced as part of public health measures supposed to improve 
population health (WHO 2014). There have also been instances of sterilization being linked 
with the criminal justice process; women from a variety of groups were forcibly sterilised in 
order to ensure that they did not pass on their ‘deviancy’ to the next generation; women who 
were sterilized include those suffering from mental disabilities, the ‘feeble minded’, the 
‘sexually deviant’ (which could be interpreted to include promiscuity, lesbianism and 
adultery) and those from undesirable ethnic groups, particularly ‘gypsies’(see for example 
Trombley 1998). ‘Gypsies’ was a general term to include many Roma ethnic groups, usually 
from central and eastern Europe.8 Although campaigners and NGOs acknowledged the 
importance of these policies in addressing increased global birth rates and the funding they 
provided to sexual and reproductive health services they called for a shift in emphasis “to 
reflect a fundamental commitment to reproductive and sexual rights as fundamental human 
rights” (Chesler 2006, 19). Such a strategy was in keeping with an approach that 
acknowledged the importance of the role of women in society rather than being solely 
concerned with restricting women’s reproductive freedom through control of their fertility.  
 
An oft cited example of a population policy that clearly infringes reproductive rights, is 
China’s “Family Planning Policy’, often called the ‘one child policy’. This policy was 
                                                          
8 The continuation of forced, or at least coerced, sterilization of Roma in Europe was brought 
to light in a 2003 report by the Center for Reproductive Rights. The report documents 
sterilization as a common experience of Roma women. In these instances women go into 
hospital when in labour, then, when about to be given a caesarean section they are told to sign 
a consent form. This form gives consent not only to a caesarean section, but also to tubal 
ligation. 
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established in 1979 as part of a broader programme of population control being instituted by 
the Chinese Government in the late 1970s with an aim of reducing China’s rapidly increasing 
population (Hesketh & Wei Xing 2005). The main substance of the policy is a restriction on 
the ability of couples, particularly those from urban areas, to have more than one child. 
However, there were exemptions from the policy for those living in rural areas particularly if 
their first child was a girl, and for ethnic minorities (Hesketh & Wei Xing 2005). The policy 
was implemented somewhat unevenly, as much power and discretion lies in the hands of 
local officials. Broadly the policy has been implemented through a series of monetary fines 
for those who breach it. More controversially it has been reported that the policy has led to 
women who have an ‘unapproved’ pregnancy being forced to have an abortion or avoiding 
antenatal healthcare for fear they would be made undergo an abortion. As recently as 2010 
Amnesty International reported that thousands of women in China were at risk of forced 
sterilization (Amnesty International 2010). It has also been reported that because women 
avoid antenatal care and deliver at home, usually without access to appropriate healthcare, 
they face much higher rates of maternal deaths (Hesketh & Wei Xing 2005). This highlights a 
number of ways in which the policy breaches basic reproductive rights. Although extreme 
this policy is not isolated and there is evidence of similarly coercive population control 
measures in other countries. Forced sterilization continues in many parts of the world today 
as does ‘induced consent’, when women are encouraged to undergo sterilization and even 
given payment or other forms of inducement as part of population control measures.  
 
Cairo was quickly followed in 1995 by the Fourth World Conference in Beijing. The Beijing 
Platform for Action states: 
 
The human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide 
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and 
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence. Equal 
relationships between women and men in matters of sexual relations and 
reproduction, including full respect for the integrity of the person, require mutual 
respect, consent and shared responsibility for sexual behaviour and its 
consequences. (Beijing Platform for Action 1995) 
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The Platform for Action again reaffirms the importance of women’s human rights 
emphasising the importance of women’s emancipation as part of the development process. 
However, in addition to the broader aims of development, the platform moves beyond this 
position and also emphasises the intrinsic importance of women’s rights. Women’s ability to 
control their reproductive futures is a necessary feature of their emancipation and a human 
right deserving of protection.  
 
The move from ‘control’ to ‘freedom’, as emphasised in the Cairo Programme, has met with 
mixed success and as detailed above many human rights violations in this area are 
continuing. However, it is clear from the above that international human rights documents 
have come to recognise that to respect women’s bodily integrity and agency it is necessary to 
protect a range of sexual and reproductive health rights which aim to facilitate women and 
girls’ ability to control the timing and number of their children. These protections are 
necessary if women are to be able to enter society as equal to men. Specifically family 
planning and contraception are mentioned as being important to this process. While abortion 
has proven to be more controversial, since Cairo it is clear that public health ethics 
arguments, particularly those regarding harm reduction, are becoming increasingly important 
as a means for advocating for abortion care (Erdman 2012; Coletti, IPAS, 2013). It has also 
been recognised across a range of human rights documents that access to safe and legal 
abortion care is necessary and expected in a number of cases (e.g where the life of the 
pregnant woman is threatened or where the woman is pregnant as a result of rape). Further 
the WHO recognises ‘safe abortion care’ as one of the seven packages necessary to improve 
maternal morbidity and mortality worldwide (WHO 2010). This serves to highlight the 
important and necessary role of safe abortion care within holistic family planning 
programmes. Although abortion is often subject to moral controversy, it is clear that unsafe 
abortions have serious negative consequences for maternal health on a global scale (Singh 
2010; WHO 2007). It is also clear that legal restrictions on the availability of abortion does 
not decrease the incidence of abortion but rather increases the incidence of unsafe abortions – 
unsafe abortions are defined by the WHO as those that involve “inadequacy of the provider’s 
skills and use of hazardous techniques and unsanitary facilities” (WHO 2007, 1). No method 
of contraception is 100% reliable and all are subject to the foibles of human use. Access to 
safe abortion care is therefore a necessary tool in family planning programmes aimed at 
reducing maternal morbidity and mortality globally. 
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In tracing the emergence of reproductive rights on a global scale it becomes clear that a 
holistic understanding of family planning services is necessary in order to improve maternal 
morbidity and mortality worldwide. Having argued, therefore, that access to contraception 
and abortion are basic reproductive rights necessary for all women we spend the final part of 
this chapter examining what is arguably one of the most controversial aspects of global 
reproductive health policy: restrictions on development aid which aim to de-couple safe 
abortion care from family planning services. 
 
IV: ACCESSING BASIC REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS – RESTRICTIONS ON 
DEVELOPMENT AID 
The most prominent example of a restriction on development aid being used to fund abortion 
services is the ‘Helms Amendment’ and its subsequent extension through the GGGR (Crane 
and Dusenbury 2004). Moving on from this example of US restrictions on development aid 
we consider some emerging examples in other regions, specifically at the European Union 
(EU) level. Therefore, it is important to note that although the US is the most prominent 
example of restrictions on development aid of this kind it is not unique. Towards the end of 
the section we detail similar restrictions in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Restricting funding for abortion services is often considered as a compromise between 
opposing views on the permissibility of the procedure (see for example DeGrazia 2012). In 
this part of the chapter we consider the legitimacy of such a position. Far from being an 
example of a compromise it is clear that such restrictions on a global scale often serve to 
skew domestic policy on abortion. By this we mean that restrictions on development aid often 
serve to restrict access to contraception and abortion services in countries where they are 
legal and as such undermine official laws on the issue. The GGR applies to countries where 
access to abortion and contraception are legal and has the effect of blocking access to these 
services in ways that contravene international human rights norms (Barot 2013). 
 
The GGR was introduced by Ronald Reagan, then President of the USA, in 1984. The GGR 
was an executive order which expanded on the Helms Amendment to the Foreign Assistance 
Act introduced by Sen. Jesse Helms in 1973. The Helms Amendment prohibited the use of 
US Foreign Aid for “the performance of abortions as a method of family planning”, and for 
use to “motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions”. At the time the Amendment was 
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introduced USAID, the government agency responsible for international development, 
strongly objected stating that it contradicted the core principle of the organization that: 
 
[E]xplicitly acknowledges that every nation is and should be free to determine its 
own policies and procedures with respect to population growth and family 
planning. In contradiction of this principle, the amendment would place U.S. 
restrictions on both developing country governments and individuals in the matter 
of free choice among the means of fertility control…that are legal in the U.S. (As 
quoted in Barot 2013, 9). 
 
Notwithstanding these objections, the Amendment was passed. It was then expanded with the 
introduction of the GGR almost 10 years later. The GGR prohibits any organisations that 
receive US government funding from facilitating access to abortion services or any advocates 
for the liberalisation of domestic abortion policy; and importantly applies even if the 
organisation provides a broad range of sexual and reproductive health services and obtains its 
funding for abortion services from another source (Center for Reproductive Rights 2000). As 
such it amounts to a restriction on both US and non-US funding: 
 
While the Helms amendment limits the use of U.S. foreign aid dollars directly, the 
gag rule went far beyond that by disqualifying foreign NGOs from eligibility for 
U.S. family planning aid entirely by virtue of their support for abortion-related 
activities subsidized by non-U.S. funds. (Barot,2013, 10) 
 
A version of the GGR has been endorsed by every Republican president since Reagan and 
rescinded by every Democrat president. The Helms Amendment has remained in place since 
its introduction in 1973. This muddled picture has had a “chilling effect” on a range of sexual 
and reproductive health services on a global scale (Barot 2013). It is important to note that 
the gag applies in countries where abortion is legal; US development aid has never been used 
to fund access to abortion where the procedure is illegal (Skuster 2004).   
 
The impact of the GGR has been assessed by several organisations including the Guttmacher 
Institute (Cohen 2006), Population Action International (2015), and the Center for 
Reproductive Rights (2010). All have highlighted the clear negative impact of this restriction 
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on maternal and reproductive health measures in affected countries. Negative impacts include 
increased maternal morbidity and mortality, an increased number of unplanned pregnancies, 
an increased number of unsafe abortions, and a subsequent increase in deaths from unsafe 
abortion. The consequence of the GGR is therefore not a decrease in the number of abortions 
but rather an interference with family planning services generally with a subsequent increase 
in the number of unsafe abortions. There are three clear reasons for these negative impacts. 
Firstly, there is confusion over what exactly is prohibited under Helms and what is prohibited 
under the GGR (Barot 2013; Barot 2011). This is what has led to the ‘chilling effect’ that 
encourages overly conservative practice as organisations do not want to be found in 
contravention of either policy. Secondly, the GGR extends the impact on the restrictions so 
that it applies not just to US Development Aid but to funds received through other avenues 
(Cohen 2006). And finally, and in some ways most worrying, the GGR results in a situation 
in which those experts who might otherwise be called upon by governments to provide 
evidence of the negative impact of unsafe abortion are restricted from speaking to these 
issues as this would constitute ‘abortion advocacy’ (Skuster 2004). An example of the impact 
of the GGR is detailed by Karen Baird: in Nepal family planning services lost $250,000 as a 
result of the GGR when they advocated for improved reproductive health care in the face of a 
maternal health crisis in that country (Baird 2004). The following quote from the Director of 
Family Planning Association of Nepal (FPAN) is stark:  
 
This is the challenge: do I listen to my own government that has asked FPAN to 
save women’s lives or do I listen to the US government? (as quoted in Baird 
2004) 
 
It is important to note that such a restriction would not be permissible were it to impact on US 
NGOs as detailed by Patty Skuster: 
 
The Global Gag Rule would be unconstitutional if applied to U.S. organizations. 
The restrictions that make up the order apply only to foreign NGOs—which do 
not have U.S. constitutional protection over free speech and free association. 
Federal courts have prohibited restrictions placed on U.S. NGOs similar to those 
of the GGR. The Constitution does not permit Congress to enact legislation that 
restricts a U.S.-based organization’s constitutional rights by dictating how a 
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grantee spends funds not provided by U.S. government sources. The U.S. 
government may not use funding restrictions to impinge upon a U.S.-based 
NGO’s ability to exercise its rights to free speech or to lobby using its own 
private funds. (Skuster 2014, 100-101) 
 
Therefore, as argued by USAID, it is clear that GGR has the potential to disrupt the 
democratic processes of the countries that it impacts on. The GGR has had significant 
negative impacts on the lives of real women in countries where access to safe abortion is a 
legal and necessary aspect of family planning services. Like all attempts to impose 
restrictions on development aid in this way, the impact is on countries where maternal 
mortality and morbidity are higher than those considered acceptable in the USA, and where 
access to safe and legal abortion is a basic health need (ICPD 1994).  
 
Other governments, including Canada, have introduced similar restrictions.9 In 2010 the 
Harper Government pledged increased levels of funding to reduce maternal mortality and 
morbidity worldwide; however, this policy was not to include increased funding for safe 
abortion care. At the EU level there was a failed attempt between 2012 and 2014 to use the 
newly introduced mechanism of a European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) to restrict EU 
development aid. The Citizenship Initiative is a mechanism introduced by the European 
Commission allowing citizens to propose legislation for consideration by the European 
Commission on any issue within its power if they gather one million signatures from at least 
seven of the 27 EU Member States. An ECI entitled, ‘One of Us’ aimed to provide human 
embryos with “dignity and integrity” and as a consequence of this “the EU should establish a 
ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, 
in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public health” (One of Us 2012). 
The initiative was introduced subsequent to a report by a conservative European think tank, 
European Dignity Watch, entitled ‘The Funding of Abortion through EU Development Aid: 
An Analysis of EU’s Sexual and Reproductive Health Policy’ which argued that funding of 
abortion services was outside EU competence and as such should not be included within the 
development aid budget (European Dignity Watch 2012). If successful ‘One of Us’ would 
have severely restricted EU development aid with a worrying negative health impact on the 
                                                          
9 http://www.sexualhealthandrights.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Global-5_Abortion.pdf 
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lives of women in countries in receipt of such aid. It would also have directly challenged 
fundamental rights of women and been in direct conflict with the aims of UN Millennium 
Development Goal five: to improve maternal health (UN MDG 2000). 
 
It is not just in the policies of national government that we are witnessing GGR style 
restrictions. In June 2014, Melinda Gates announced that the Gates Foundation would no 
longer fund abortions. Gates states that abortion is too controversial and ultimately harmful to 
helping women worldwide. In her explanation of this decision, Gates highlights the fact that 
the Foundation will continue to advocate for family planning and the ability of women 
worldwide to space their children. However, she thinks that abortion should be dealt with 
separately. Specifically she says: 
 
The question of abortion should be dealt with separately. Both in the United States and 
around the world the emotional and personal debate about abortion is threatening to get 
in the way of the lifesaving consensus regarding basic family planning.10 
 
Gates’ rhetoric in justifying the position with regard to funding implies that they have chosen 
to stop funding abortions in order to promote the greater good overall. One of the global 
development goals of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is improvement in family 
planning: 
 
OUR GOAL: to bring access to high-quality contraceptive information, services, 
and supplies to an additional 120 million women and girls in the poorest countries 
by 2020 without coercion or discrimination, with the longer-term goal of universal 
access to voluntary family planning.11 
 
The tension between the above goal and the refusal to fund abortion services contributes to 
the exceptionalisation of abortion care despite the clear evidence that such services are a 
necessary part of global family planning strategies and an important part of any strategy 
                                                          
10 http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2014/06/12/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation-
says-it-will-no-longer-fund-abortion/ (accessed 21/02/15) 
11 http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Development/Family-Planning 
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which aims to reduce maternal morbidity and mortality (WHO 2007). This approach also 
propagates the idea that contraception is the only tool necessary to combat family planning; 
this is despite the fact that there is much evidence to suggest that access to abortion and 
contraception should not be viewed as mutually exclusive but rather both should form part of 
holistic family planning strategies. In the words of Marge Berer: 
 
[I] feel … worried about the Gates Foundation’s effects on things, because I think 
theirs is such a retrograde approach. Ideologically, it’s supposedly prochoice, but 
it’s very, very antichoice on many levels. (Berer 2014) 
 
Restrictions on development aid of the sort outlined in this section are worrying for many 
reasons. They skew democratic processes and create negative health consequences of a sort 
that would not be acceptable in the country they originate in. Further the attempt to break 
down family planning policies into component parts ignores the reality of the necessity of 
both access to contraception and safe abortion care if we are to protect and promote basic 
reproductive rights. Restrictions that exceptionalise abortion are counter to the accepted 
principle of most international health bodies that such care is a necessary basic health need. It 
is for this reason that we suggest that those who are interested to protect basic reproductive 
rights should challenge the legitimacy of such restrictions. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have argued on grounds of gender equality that access to contraception and 
abortion are basic reproductive rights. Consequently we argued that such rights should be 
prioritised and not sacrificed in order to attain other goods. We have also emphasised the 
importance of these rights not being sacrificed as part of some effort at compromise for those 
who wish to restrict access to abortion domestically but have been unsuccessful in this aim.  
 
International human rights norms have increasingly come to reflect and acknowledge the 
importance of access to abortion and contraception as integral to women’s ability to control 
the number and timing of their children. These norms reflect our view that such rights are 
basic reproductive rights and should be protected as such. 
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Globally we found that these rights are often not delivered and the most vulnerable women 
are too often denied them and we discussed some policies and practices which are eroding 
these rights. The slogan “Free, Safe and Legal” has long been a mantra of the reproductive 
rights movement. Restrictions on development aid unfairly impact on women in developing 
countries and restrict their ability to access the basic reproductive health care that they most 
need. We have highlighted both the principled objections to such restrictions and also some 
of the practical negative outcomes of these policies.  
 
Many are now focused on ‘Post 2015’ global reproductive health goals. Given the 
improvements in maternal health on a worldwide scale since ICPD 1994 it would be a pity if 
retrograde steps such as restrictions on development aid with regard to family planning 
services were to become common place. The rhetoric of appeasement such as that evident in 
the quote from Melinda Gates in this chapter should be challenged. Access to safe abortion 
cannot be disentangled from access to contraception as part of the protection of women’s 
basic reproductive rights. Attempting to de-couple access to safe abortion care goes against 
accepted development policy since 1994 which has “linked abortion with other key public 
health and women’s health rights issues” (Hessini 2005). It is important, therefore, that we 
ensure that access to both contraception and safe abortion care occupies a prominent space in 
the post 2015 ICPD agenda (Barot 2014). 
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